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markets in the Kelso-Crawford framework with the addition of job security regulation. In
this note we show that any assignment of workers to firms in such an outcome must be a Nash
equilibrium outcome of a natural auction where firms compete for workers. This parallels results
in the literature about stable outcomes and similar auctions, and yields price-of-anarchy bounds
for such auction games.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this note is to study a connection between a model of labor markets with regulation
recently defined and analyzed in Fu et al. (2016) and a model of simultaneous single-item auctions
which was originally suggested by Bikhchandani (1999) and which has received significant attention
in the last few years in the computer science literature on algorithmic game theory. This connection
yields new results in both models. In particular, the results of Fu et al. (2016) on labor markets
with regulation imply (via the connection we establish here) new bounds on the price of anarchy
and the price of stability of simultaneous second price auctions as well as new guarantees on the
existence of pure Nash equilibria in this auction game.
In the classical labor market model due to Kelso and Crawford (1982) there is a set of firms
N , a set of workers M , and a production function vn : 2M → <+ for every firm n ∈ N , where
vn(S) is the production value of firm n if it hires a subset workers S ∈ 2M . Three main results
of this theory are that gross-substitutability of all production functions is a sufficient condition for
the existence of a stable matching of workers and firms, that all stable matchings are efficient, and
that in fact gross-substitutability is also a necessary condition for the above two properties to hold
(this last property is due to Gul and Stacchetti (1999)).
Bikhchandani (1999) studies a complete-information auction game where firms compete simul-
taneously for employees by proposing salaries, and employees pursue the highest offer. This is
known in the literature on combinatorial auctions as a First Price Item Bidding (FPIB) auction.
Bikhchandani (1999) shows a connection between this auction game and the classic labor market
model described above, by showing a correspondence between the set of Nash equilibrium (NE)
outcomes of the FPIB game and the set of stable outcomes of a labor market.1
In a recent paper (Fu et al., 2016) we modify the classic labor market model and study labor
markets with regulation designed to provide employees with job security. To capture job security we
have introduced a weaker solution concept termed JS-stability (where JS stands for job security).
That previous paper has three main results: it provides sufficient conditions on the structure of
the production functions that ensure the existence of JS-stability, it shows that the welfare in any
JS-stable outcome is at least half of the optimal welfare, and it describes necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of efficient JS-stable outcomes. These results therefore provide a mirror
image of the three main results of classic labor markets (without job security) described above.
Continuing this thread of thought, our result in this current note parallels the connection
between the classic labor market and the FPIB game of Bikhchandani (1999). Specifically, we
show a connection between labor markets with job security and the Second Price Item Bidding
(SPIB) auction game, introduced in (Christodoulou et al., 2008). The difference between FPIB
and SPIB is that in the latter an employee’s salary is determined by the second highest offer and not
the first. While Bikhchandani (1999) shows a correspondence between the set of pure NE outcomes
of the FPIB auction game and the set of stable matchings of the classic labor market (without
regulation), we show here a correspondence between the set of pure NE outcomes of the SPIB
auction game and the set of JS-stable outcomes in our model of labor markets with regulation.
The two theories of labor markets with and without job security are therefore parallel with respect
to this property as well. As mentioned above, as an immediate corollary of this connection we
obtain several results regarding existence of pure Nash equilibria in the SPIB auction game, and
1The terminology of Bikhchandani (1999) uses buyers and items instead of firms and workers, but the difference
is only semantic, as we explain below.
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the price of anarchy and price of stability in this game.
Section 2 gives more details on the model of a labor market with regulation. Section 3 ana-
lyzes the connection between the labor market model and the auction model, and describes some
corollaries that this connection yields.
2 Labor Markets with Regulation
The classical labor market model due to Kelso and Crawford (1982) is given by a tuple (N,M, (vn)n∈N ),
where N denotes the set of firms, M the set of workers and vn : 2M → <+ is the production func-
tion of firm n in monetary units. We assume throughout that the functions vn are monotonically
increasing and calibrate vn(∅) = 0. A job market allocation is a pair (A, s), consisting of an assign-
ment A = {A1, · · · , AN} and a salary vector s = {sm}m∈M . An assignment A is a partition of the
set N of workers, where An is the set of workers employed by firm n. Given an allocation (A, s)
the utility of worker m is her salary sm and the utility of firm n is Π
n(A, s) = vn(An)−∑m∈An sm,
i.e., the value that the firm obtains from employing the workers in An minus the sum of salaries to
these workers. The efficiency level (or welfare level) of an assignment A is Pv(A) =
∑
n v
n(An).2
The central solution concept in the literature on labor markets is that of stability:
Definition 1. An allocation (A, s) is individually rational (IR) if, for all n, Πn(A; s) ≥ 0 and
sm ≥ 0 for all m ∈ An.
Definition 2. A coalition {n,C} is a blocking coalition for an allocation (A, s) if and only if there
exists a vector of salaries, sˆ ∈ <C+, such that:
1. sˆm ≥ sm ∀k ∈ N,m ∈ Ak ∩ C (workers in C are better-off),
2. vn(C)−∑m∈C sˆm ≥ vn(An)−∑m∈An sm (firm n is better-off),
with at least one of the inequalities being strict. An allocation (A, s) is stable if and only if it is
IR and there exist no blocking coalitions for it.
Stable outcomes (whenever they exist) can be shown to exhibit maximum efficiency level. How-
ever, they are guaranteed to exist only when firms’ production functions are gross substitutes (Gul
and Stacchetti, 1999). Partly motivated by an attempt to broaden existence of stable outcomes
and partly motivated by job security regulations common in many labor markets, the current set
of authors considered in Fu et al. (2016) a weaker notion of stability termed JS-stability, where JS
stands for Job Security:
Definition 3. A coalition {n,C} is a JS-blocking coalition for an allocation (A, s) if and only if
it is a blocking coalition, and additionally An ⊂ C. An allocation (A, s) is JS-stable if and only
if it is IR and there exist no JS-blocking coalitions for it.
The extra requirement An ⊂ C is what captures job security. In other words, a blocking firm can
only consider adding new workers and cannot unilaterally dismiss any of its current workers. A
detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of this stability concept is given in our
previous paper (Fu et al., 2016).
2This model can be easily extended to allow for employees’ utility to be firm-dependent and to allow for unemployed
workers. For more details the reader is referred to Fu et al. (2016).
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In Fu et al. (2016) we showed that JS-stable outcomes are guaranteed to exist for a class
of valuation functions much larger than gross-substitutes. The efficiency loss when relaxing the
stability notion to JS-stability was quantified as follows.
Definition 4. A firm’s production function v is fractionally subadditive on a set C ⊆ M , if there
exist salaries s ∈ <C+ such that
∑
m∈C sm = v(C) and ∀D ⊂ C,
∑
m∈D sm ≤ v(D). A production
function v is fractionally subadditive if it is fractionally subadditive on all subsets of M .
Definition 5. A firm’s production function v is almost fractionally subadditive (AFS) if:
1. For any C ⊂M (excluding C = M) v is fractionally subadditive on C, and
2. v(M) ≤ 1|M |−1
∑
m∈M v(M \m).
AFS strictly contains FS (Fu et al., 2016), and FS significantly expands the class of gross-substitutes
valuations (Lehmann et al., 2006). The main results in Fu et al. (2016) can be summarized as
follows:
Theorem 1 (Fu et al., 2016). Given any job market (N,M, (vn)n∈N ),
1. If an allocation (A, s) is JS-stable, and if A¯ is an assignment that maximizes the efficiency
level, then P (A) ≥ 12P (A¯).
2. If each vn is in AFS, then an efficient JS-stable outcome is guaranteed to exist.
Furthermore, for any u /∈ AFS there exist an integer k and production functions v1, ..., vk ∈
AFS such that no efficient JS-stable outcome exists in the job market with production functions
(u, v1, ..., vk).
We refer the reader to Fu et al. (2016) for intuition of the AFS class and the proof of the
theorem.
3 Assigning Workers Through an Auction
The notion of a stable outcome tells us what we can expect from an outcome in a labor market.
Put differently, a non-stable outcome is something we cannot expect, as either one of the players
(firms or workers) has negative utility, and in this case it can simply walk away from the market,
or alternatively a coalition of a firm and workers can jointly walk away from the market and be
better off. However, how markets reach stability is left open. To cope with this question we look
at the market as a non-cooperative game where firms bid simultaneously for workers. Each worker
is then assigned to work for the highest bidder at a salary equal the second highest bid. We refer
to this game as a second-price item-bidding (SPIB) auction.
Nash equilibrium outcomes of this game were first analyzed by Christodoulou et al. (2008).
Note that a trivial Nash equilibrium always exists in any SPIB auction, where one bidder bids
“infinity” on every item and every other bidder bids zero. Such equilibria are neither interesting
nor realistic. To exclude such equilibria, a bidder is said to be no-overbidding if the sum of her
bids on any subset of items is no larger than her valuation for the subset. An equilibrium is no-
overbidding if all bidders’ equilibrium strategies are no-overbidding. Christodoulou et al. (2008)
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showed that pure no-overbidding Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist for SPIB auctions when
all prodution functions are fractionally subadditive. Several additional papers continued to study
this model, analyzing its “price of anarchy”, which measures the efficiency level guaranteed by
any no-overbidding Nash equilibrium, when it exists, relative to the optimal efficiency level. For
example, Bhawalkar and Roughgarden (2011) showed that when buyers’ valuations are subadditive,
a no-overbidding equilibrium, when it exists, always guarantees an efficiency level that is at least
half of the maximum possible. The literature also studies the “price of stability” of various models,
which is the efficiency that the best Nash equilibrium outcome guarantees relative to the optimal
efficiency.
The purpose of this note is to point at the connection of no-overbidding Nash equilibria of the
SPIB auction game to JS-stable outcomes. The notion of no-overbidding we use here is a relaxation
of the one used in Christodoulou et al. (2008) and Bhawalkar and Roughgarden (2011):
Definition 6. A NE of the SPIB auction is weakly-no-overbidding if the bids of each bidder on the
subset of items allocated to her does not exceed her value for these items.
Nash equilibria that are weakly no-overbidding clearly contain all Nash equilibria with no-overbidding.
Our main result is as follows:
Theorem 2. There exists a pure Nash equilibrium with weak-no-overbidding in the SPIB auction
of a labor market if and only if there exists a JS-stable outcome in this market. Furthermore, the
assignments of workers to firms in the Nash equilibria outcomes are identical to the assignments in
the JS-stable outcomes (though salaries need not be identical).
In other words, this theorem ties existence of JS-stable outcomes to existence of pure NE with
weak no-overbidding. It also asserts that workers’ assignments in both types of outcomes are
identical, while salaries may differ. In particular, in the construction used in our proof, the Nash
equilibrium salaries are generally lower than the JS-stable salaries (for the same assignments).
Proof. (Theorem 2) Let ~p be a NE with weak no-overbidding of the SPIB auction and let then
An = Dn(~p) denote the set of workers assigned to firm n in that equilibrium. Set a new salary
for each worker m ∈ M to be sm = pn(m)m , i.e., the salary proposed by the firm that receives
this worker in the equilibrium. We now argue that (A, s) is a JS-stable outcome. To see this
note that as the equilibrium had the weak no-overbidding property, vn(An) ≥ ∑m∈An sm, hence
this outcome is IR. The fact that ~p is a NE implies that, for any firm n and C ⊂ M \ An,
vn(C|An) ≤ ∑m∈C pn(m)m = ∑m∈C sm. Thus, there does not exist a blocking coalition for (A, s),
and the claim follows.
As for the other direction let (A, s) be a JS-stable outcome. Consider the following bidding
strategy in the SPIB auction:
pnm =
 sm if m ∈ A
n
0 if m /∈ An
We claim that ~p is a NE with weak no-overbidding. Note that ~p induces an allocation where
firm n wins An, and pays zero. JS-stability implies vn(An) ≥ ∑m∈An sm, hence pn satisfies weak
no-overbidding.
To verify that this is a Nash equilibrium, fix a firm n, and suppose towards a contradiction that
there exists a strictly profitable deviation from pn for firm n. Suppose that the firm receives some
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set of workers X in this deviation. Since n pays a salary of zero for each worker m ∈ An we can
assume without loss of generality that An ⊂ X. To win any m ∈ X \ An, firm n must submit a
salary larger than sm, therefore it will pay a salary of sm to m. Since (n,X \An) is not a blocking
coalition, we have vn(X \An|An) ≤∑m∈X\An sm. Thus, X does not strictly increase n’s utility, a
contradiction. The claim follows.
On top of the non-cooperative strategic reasoning to the emergence of JS-stable assignments,
the formal connection between the two models coupled with Theorem 1 from our previous paper
applies to questions of existence and efficiency of Nash equilibria outcomes studied in the literature
on simultaneous single-item auctions. In particular, the combination of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
immediately implies:
Corollary 1. The price of anarchy of any second-price item-bidding auction is 2, regardless of
the class of production functions. In other words, if a weakly no-overbidding equilibrium exists, its
efficiency level is at least half of the maximum attainable by any allocation.
Note that this result does not assume anything about the production functions, while all other
results in this literature need to assume something about the production functions.
Corollary 2. When all bidders’ valuations are in AFS, a weakly-no-overbidding efficient Nash
equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. Thus, the price of stability of any second-price item-bidding
auction with valuations in AFS is 1. Furthermore, AFS is the maximal class of valuations that
guarantees these properties.
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